With the variables of a program classified as L (low, public) or H (high, private), the secure information flow problem is concerned with preventing the program from leaking information from H variables to L variables. In the context of a multi-threaded imperative language with probabilistic scheduling, the goal can be formalized as a probabilistic noninterference property. Previous work identified a type system sufficient to guarantee probabilistic noninterference, but at the cost of severe restrictions to prevent timing leaks -for example, H variables were forbidden in the guards of while loops. Here we present a more permissive type system that allows the running times of threads to depend on the values of H variables, provided that these timing variations cannot affect the values of L variables. The type system gives each command a type of the form τ 1 cmd τ 2 ; this type says that the command assigns only to variables of level τ 1 (or higher) and has running time that depends only on variables of level τ 2 (or lower). Also it uses types of the form τ cmd n for commands that terminate in exactly n steps. With these typings, timing leaks can be prevented by demanding that no assignment to an L variable may sequentially follow a command whose running time depends on H variables. We prove that well-typed multi-threaded programs satisfy a property that we call weak probabilistic noninterference; it is based on a notion of weak probabilistic bisimulation for Markov chains, allowing two Markov chains to be regarded as equivalent even when one "runs" more slowly than the other. Finally, we show that the language can safely be extended with a fork command that allows new threads to be spawned.
Introduction
The secure information flow problem is concerned with finding techniques to ensure that programs do not leak sensitive data. It is a well-studied problem; see [18] for a comprehensive survey. In this paper, as in [22] and [23] , we consider a simple multi-threaded imperative programming language in which each variable is classified either as L (low, public) or H (high, private). Our goal is to develop a static analysis that ensures that a program cannot leak the values of H variables. Of course, the possible ways of leaking information depend on what is observable. If we can observe the running program from the outside, seeing running time or the usage of various system resources, then controlling leaks is very difficult, because leaks can be based on low-level implementation details, such as caching behavior. Hence our focus, as in previous work, is on controlling internal leaks, in which information about H variables is somehow transmitted to L variables. This makes the task more tractable, because we can control what is observable by the running program -for example, we can deny it access to a real-time clock.
More precisely, we wish to achieve noninterference [24] properties, which assert that changing the initial values of H variables cannot affect the final values of L variables. Given the nondeterminism associated with multi-threading, and our assumption that thread scheduling is probabilistic, we require more precisely that changing the initial values of H variables cannot affect the joint probability distribution of the possible final values of L variables; this property is called probabilistic noninterference [23] .
Here's a simple example of the sort of multi-threaded program we are considering. Let thread α be while x > 0 do x := x − 1 let thread β be y := 1 and let thread γ be y := 2 where x is a H variable, which is assumed to be non-negative, and y is a L variable. We run this program under a uniform probabilistic scheduler, which at each computation step chooses either thread α, β, or γ, each with probability 1/3. The state of the running program is given by a global configuration (O, µ) consisting of the thread pool O and the shared memory µ. For example, if we start in a memory with x = 2 and y = 0, the program might pass through the sequence of global configurations shown in Fig. 1 , where the annotation on the double arrow gives the probability of making that transition.
Does this program satisfy secure information flow? The answer depends on what observations are permitted. If we can observe the program from the outside, seeing when threads terminate, then the program is clearly dangerous -the running time of thread α reveals information about the initial value of the H variable x. But if we can only observe the program from the inside, seeing just the final values of L variables, then the program is safe, because it satisfies probabilistic noninterference -regardless of the initial value of x, the final value of y is either 1 or 2, each with probability 1/2. In this work (as in [23] ) our concern is only with preventing internal leaks, by establishing probabilistic noninterference. Certainly there are applications where this approach is not good enough, but it does seem well-suited to the case where we have downloaded some mobile code, which we do not trust fully, to execute on our machine. Here we have the advantage that the execution of the mobile code cannot be observed externally (at the originating site, for example) unless we allow it to be. At any rate, preventing external leaks requires much more severe restrictions on programs -see for example [2] .
Returning to our example program, suppose that we combine threads α and γ sequentially, so that thread α becomes while x > 0 do x := x − 1; y := 2 and thread β remains y := 1. In this case, the program is unsafe, even with respect to internal observations, because now the likely outcome of the race between the two assignments y := 1 and y := 2 depends on the initial value of x. More precisely, the larger the initial value of x, the greater the probability that the final value of y is 2. For example, a direct simulation shows that if the initial value of x is 0, then the final value of y is 1 with probability 1/4 and 2 with probability 3/4; but if the initial value of x is 5, then the final value of y is 1 with probability 1/4096 and 2 with probability 4095/4096. Hence this program does not satisfy probabilistic noninterference. Note that it does, however, satisfy a weaker property, possibilistic noninterference, because, regardless of the initial value of x, it is possible for the final value of y to be either 1 or 2.
A type system that guarantees possibilistic noninterference was given in [22] . Building on that work, a type system for probabilistic noninterference was given in [23] . These systems classify an expression e as H if it contains any H variables, and L otherwise. The latter system uses these classifications to impose the following restrictions:
1. Only L expressions can be assigned to L variables. 2. A guarded command with H guard cannot assign to L variables. 3. The guard of a while loop must be L. 4. An if with H guard must be protected, so that it executes atomically, and can contain no while loops within its branches.
Restrictions 1 and 2 prevent what Denning [8] long ago called explicit and implicit flows, respectively. In a language without concurrency, restrictions 1 and 2 are sufficient to guarantee noninterference -see for example [24] . Restrictions 3 and 4 were introduced to prevent timing-based flows in multi-threaded programs; unfortunately, they restrict the set of allowable programs quite severely. A recent paper by Honda, Vasconcelos, and Yoshida [12] explores secure information flow in the π-calculus, showing in particular that the system of [22] can be embedded into their system. Most interestingly, they propose enriching the set of command types of [22] from -H cmd, for commands that assign only to H variables and are guaranteed to terminate; and -L cmd, for commands that assign to L variables or might not terminate, -τ cmd ⇓, for commands that assign only to variables of type τ (or higher) and are guaranteed to terminate; and -τ cmd ⇑, for commands that assign only to variables of type τ (or higher) and might not terminate.
They then argue that in some cases H variables can be used in the guards of while loops without sacrificing possibilistic noninterference. Inspired by this suggestion, we can observe that the command typings used in [22] and [23] conflate two distinct issues: what does a command assign to, and what is the command's running time. This leads us to propose command types with two parameters to address these two issues separately. More precisely, our new system will classify the expressions and commands of a program as follows:
1. An expression e is classified as H if it contains any H variables; otherwise it is classified as L. 2. A command c is classified as τ 1 cmd τ 2 if it assigns only to variables of type τ 1 (or higher) and its running time depends only on variables of type τ 2 (or lower). 3. A command c is classified as τ cmd n if it assigns only to variables of type τ (or higher) and it is guaranteed to terminate in exactly n steps.
Using these classifications, the type system imposes the following restrictions:
1. Only L expressions can be assigned to L variables. 2. A guarded command with H guard cannot assign to L variables. 3. A command whose running time depends on H variables cannot be followed sequentially by a command that assigns to L variables.
The third restriction replaces restrictions 3 and 4 of [23] ; it more accurately prevents flows based on timing. For example, the original thread α considered above,
is rejected by the type system of [23] , simply because the guard of the while loop contains the H variable x. Under our new system, this thread is allowed, as it should be. But the dangerous modified thread α,
is rejected -because the running time of the while loop depends on the H variable x, it cannot be followed sequentially by an assignment to the L variable y. Let's consider some other examples informally, assuming that x : H and y : L.
H cmd H 7. y := 5; while x + 1 do skip : L cmd H Example 3 shows that an if can have a H guard and nevertheless have a known running time; such a command can be sequentially followed by a L assignment without any problem.
Our typings also satisfy interesting subtyping rules. As usual, we have L ⊆ H. Furthermore, command types are contravariant in their first position, and covariant in their second position. Also, τ cmd n ⊆ τ cmd L, because if a command always halts in n steps, then its running time doesn't depend on the values of H variables. This subtyping rule implies that example 3 above also has type H cmd L.
The main result of this paper is that any multi-threaded program that is well typed under our typing rules satisfies a bisimulation-based property that we call weak probabilistic noninterference. We give an overview of our approach here.
First, we let Γ denote an identifier typing, which classifies program variables as L or H. Formally, Γ is a mapping from identifiers to types of the form τ var. Next, we define the important property of low-equivalence of memories: Definition 1.1. Memories µ and ν are low-equivalent with respect to Γ, written µ ∼ Γ ν, if µ, ν, and Γ have the same domain and µ and ν agree on all L variables.
On individual commands, the key property ensured by the type system is that if a well-typed command c is run twice, under two low-equivalent memories, then in each execution it will make exactly the same sequence of assignments to L variables, at the same times. More precisely, we can define an equivalence relation, which we also call ∼ Γ , on well-typed commands such that if low-equivalent commands c and d are run for a single step under low-equivalent memories µ and ν, then the results are equivalent in the sense that the resulting commands and memories are still lowequivalent. (This is the Sequential Noninterference Theorem, which will be proved in Section 5.) A subtle point, however, is that (c, µ) might terminate in one step, going to a terminal configuration µ , while (d, ν) might not, going to a non-terminal configuration (d , ν ). In this case, however, it is guaranteed that d will have a type of the form H cmd τ , which means that it will make no further assignments to L variables.
Now consider a pool O of threads running concurrently. Our semantics specifies that at each step, we pick a thread at random and run it for a step. This makes our program into a Markov chain whose states are global configurations (O, µ) consisting of a thread pool and a shared memory. Hence if we have a well-typed thread pool O and low-equivalent memories µ and ν, we would like to argue some sort of equivalence between the Markov chains starting from (O, µ) and from (O, ν).
In this context, a standard notion of equivalence is probabilistic bisimulation [15, 19] , which we review in Section 3.1. Unfortunately, this equivalence is not quite suited to our type system, because it is too strict with respect to timing; in particular, probabilistic bisimulation cannot accommodate threads whose running time depends on H variables. For this reason, we introduce a notion of weak probabilistic bisimulation, which is more relaxed with respect to timing and which is suitable for our Markov chains; using this notion, we are able to prove the soundness of our typing rules.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the multi-threaded language and its semantics. In Section 3, we define weak probabilistic bisimulation on Markov chains, and use this notion in defining our desired security property, which we call weak probabilistic noninterference. In Section 4, we define our type system formally. In Section 5, we establish the basic properties of the type system, culminating in the Sequential Noninterference Theorem. Then, in Section 6, we prove that every well-typed multi-threaded program satisfies weak probabilistic noninterference. In Section 7, we briefly show that we can accommodate an extended language with a fork command that allows us to spawn new threads dynamically. Finally, Section 8 discusses some related work and Section 9 concludes.
The multi-threaded language
Threads are written in the simple imperative language: In our syntax, metavariable x ranges over identifiers and n over integer literals. Integers are the only values; we use 0 for false and nonzero for true. We assume that expressions are free of side effects and are total. The command protect c causes c to be executed atomically; this is important only when concurrency is considered. Programs are executed with respect to a memory µ, which is a mapping from identifiers to integers. Also, we assume for simplicity that expressions are evaluated atomically; thus we simply extend a memory µ in the obvious way to map expressions to integers, writing µ(e) to denote the value of expression e in memory µ.
We define the semantics of commands via a sequential transition relation −→ on configurations. A configuration C is either a pair (c, µ) or simply a memory µ. In the first case, c is the command yet to be executed; in the second case, the command has terminated, yielding final memory µ. The sequential transition relation is defined by the (completely standard) structural operational semantics [10] shown in Fig. 2 . In rule (ATOMICITY), note that (as usual) −→ * denotes the reflexive transitive closure of −→. Also, we write −→ i , with i 0, to denote the i-fold self-composition of −→.
Note that our sequential transition relation −→ is deterministic and total (if some obvious restrictions are met): Also, the behavior of sequential composition is characterized by the following two lemmas, which have simple proofs by induction: 
(while e do c, µ) −→ (c; while e do c, µ) The multi-threaded programs that we consider here consist simply of a set of commands (the threads) running concurrently under a shared memory µ. We model this set as a thread pool O, which is a finite function from thread identifiers (α, β, γ, . . .) to commands. A pair (O, µ), consisting of a thread pool and a shared memory, is called a global configuration.
A multi-threaded program is executed in an interleaving manner, by repeatedly choosing a thread to run for a step. We assume that the choice is made probabilistically, with each thread having an equal probability of being chosen at each step -that is, we assume a uniform thread scheduler. We formalize this by defining a global transition relation , which deals with an empty thread pool, is needed to make a multithreaded program be a discrete Markov chain [9] . The states of the Markov chain are global configurations and the transition matrix is governed by It should be acknowledged that building an efficient implementation of our language would be a challenge, because of the fine-grained interleaving specified by rule (GLOBAL). Clearly, ordinary real-time slicing would be inadequate, because the actual running times of commands will depend on low-level details (such as cache behavior) that are not modeled in our semantics. Also, rule (ATOMICITY) needs to be handled.
Our security property
In this section, we precisely define the weak probabilistic noninterference property that our type system aims to guarantee.
As defined in [23] , a program satisfies probabilistic noninterference if the joint probability distribution of the final values of L variables is independent of the initial values of H variables. However, the effect of this definition is unclear in the case of programs that may not terminate -for such programs, the L variables may never get final values. The treatment of nontermination is especially important for our type system, because we allow H variables in the guards of while loops; as a result, the probability of nontermination can be affected by the initial values of H variables.
We therefore follow the approach of Sabelfeld and Sands [19] in defining our security property using bisimulation. We will say that thread pool O is secure provided that, for low-equivalent memories µ and ν, (O, µ) and (O, ν) are bisimilar, for an appropriate notion of probabilistic bisimilarity. Unlike [19] , however, our notion of probabilistic bisimilarity needs to be weak, to allow the possibility that (O, µ) and (O, ν) do not run at the same speed.
Before proceeding further with the definition of our security property, we first pause to develop the needed notion of weak probabilistic bisimulation on Markov chains; we do this abstractly in the next subsection.
Probabilistic bisimulation on Markov chains
Given a finite or countably infinite Markov chain [9] with state set S and transition probabilities p st for s, t ∈ S, we may be able to define an equivalence relation ≈ on S such that for any equivalence class A, we don't care which state within the equivalence class we are in. Then when we "run" the Markov chain, we care only about the sequence of equivalence classes entered.
A natural question is whether we can form a quotient Markov chain S/ ≈ whose states are the equivalence classes of ≈. This turns out to be possible iff ≈ is a probabilistic bisimulation, which means that for all equivalence classes A and B, the probability of going (in one step) from a state a ∈ A to some state in B is independent of a; that is, for any a ∈ A,
We denote this common probability by p AB . The condition was first identified by Kemeny and Snell [14, p. 124] , who called it "lumpability"; Larsen and Skou [15] later called it "probabilistic bisimulation". More recently, Hermanns [11] includes a lengthy discussion of probabilistic bisimulation, and Sabelfeld and Sands [19] were the first to apply it to the information flow problem. Note, however, that the probabilistic bisimulation condition is very strong with respect to timing; if we run the Markov chain starting from two equivalent states, then the two runs will need to pass through the same equivalence classes at the same times.
As a result, this condition is not suitable for our type system, which allows the running times of threads to depend on the values of H variables. Instead, we need a notion of probabilistic bisimulation that is less demanding about timing. In particular, if two runs reach the same outcome, but one runs more slowly than the other, this should be acceptable.
For example, consider the Markov chain given in Fig. 4 , where the dashed boxes denote the equivalence classes of ≈. In this case ≈ is not a probabilistic bisimulation, because states a 1 and a 2 have different probabilities of going in one step to the equivalence class B: a 1 goes with probability 1/3, while a 2 goes with probability 2/3.
However, if we abstract away from time, then it seems reasonable to say that states a 1 and a 2 are equivalent, since we can see that both have probability 2/3 of going to equivalence class B, possibly after "stuttering" within class A for a while.
We can make this notion of weak probabilistic bisimulation precise using an approach similar to that of Baier and Hermanns [5] . Given two distinct equivalence classes A and B and state a ∈ A, we let P(a, A, B) denote the probability of starting at a, moving for 0 or more steps within A, and then entering B. We can now define weak probabilistic bisimulation: P(a, A, B) is independent of the choice of a. In this case, we define P(A, B) to be this unique value.
Weak probabilistic bisimulation is an appropriate notion if we are interested in the sequence of equivalence classes of ≈ that are visited, but we don't care how long the chain remains in each class.
As noted above, our notion of weak probabilistic bisimulation is similar to that proposed in [5] . Also, Aldini [3] has recently applied this notion to the secure information flow problem. However, it should be noted that these efforts are based in a process algebra setting, in which transitions are labeled with actions and the "weakness" of the bisimulation is based on disregarding "internal" actions, namely those labeled with τ . 1 In contrast, the weak probabilistic bisimulation that we develop here does not rely on an a priori notion that certain "internal" transitions can be ignored. Instead, our notion of which transitions can be ignored is based solely on the equivalence relation ≈; that is, a Markov chain transition can be ignored precisely if it stays within the same equivalence class of ≈.
We now discuss techniques for calculating the probabilities P(a, A, B). Following [5] , we observe that these probabilities solve the equation system:
For example, in the Markov chain in Fig. 4 we have and
which implies that
Calculating the probabilities P(a, A, B) is, unfortunately, more subtle in general than is suggested by this example. The trouble is that equation system (2) need not have a unique solution. One classic example that illustrates this is a random walk Markov chain [9] , as shown in Fig. 5 . (Here p and q can be any numbers satisfying p, q 0 and p + q = 1.) In this case, equation system (2) specializes to
Now it is easy to see that
solves the equation system. But
also solves the equation system, provided that p > 0. In fact, Feller [9] shows that the actual probabilities are We further remark that equation system (2) need not be uniquely solvable even in the case of a Markov chain with finitely many states. Consider the example of Fig. 6 . In this case, equation system (2) specializes to We are now ready to define our security property precisely.
Weak probabilistic noninterference
As indicated above, we will say that O is secure provided that, for any lowequivalent memories µ and ν, (O, µ) ≈ (O, ν) for some weak probabilistic bisimulation ≈. However, we cannot allow ≈ to be just any weak probabilistic bisimulation. In particular, the universal relation (which puts all global configurations into the same equivalence class) is trivially a weak probabilistic bisimulation, but it is not suitable because it equates (O 1 , µ) and (O 2 , ν) even if µ and ν are not low-equivalent. This motivates the following definition: Definition 3.2. Let ≈ be an equivalence relation on the space of global configurations (O, µ). We say that ≈ is a weak probabilistic low bisimulation if it is a weak probabilistic bisimulation such that (O 1 , µ) ≈ (O 2 , ν) implies that µ ∼ Γ ν. We further say that two global configurations are weak probabilistic low bisimilar if they are related by some weak probabilistic low bisimulation.
Finally, we can define our security property: Now we are ready to present our type system formally.
The type system
Our type system is based upon the following types:
We write τ cmd _ when we don't care about the "running time" component of the type. For simplicity, we consider just two security levels, L and H, but it is straightforward to generalize to an arbitrary lattice of security levels.
The rules of the type system are given in Figs 7 and 8. In the rules (IF), (WHILE), and (COMPOSE)
Remarkably, Boudol and Castellani [7] independently developed a type system almost identical to this one, except that their system does not include types of the form τ cmd n.
As an example, we show the derivation of the typing of example 7 from the Introduction:
by rule (INT). Then we get
by rule (ASSIGN) on (3), and
by rule (SUBSUMP) on (4) using the third rule (CMD). Next we have
from rule (R-VAL) and
by rule (INT), which gives by rule (SUBSUMP) on (7) using rule (BASE), and
by rule (SUM) on (6) and (8). Next
by rule (SKIP), and hence
by rule (SUBSUMP) on (10) using the third rule (CMD). Hence we get
by rule (WHILE) on (9) and (11), since H ⊆ H (by rule (REFLEX)) and L ⊆ H (by rule (BASE)), and since H ∨ L = H. And finally, we get
by the second rule (COMPOSE) on (5) and (12)
We now give some discussion of the typing rules. The first (IF) rule says that an if statement takes n + 1 steps if both its branches take n steps. This rule can sometimes be used to "pad" a command to eliminate timing leaks, as in the transformation approach proposed by Johan Agat [1] . For example, if x : H and y : L, then the thread if x = 0 then x := x * x; x := x * x else x := x + 1; y := 0 is dangerous, because the time at which y is assigned 0 depends on the value of x. And this program is not well typed under our rules -the then branch of the if has type H cmd 2 and the else branch has type H cmd 1, which means that the first (IF) rule does not apply. Instead we must coerce the two branches to type H cmd L and use the second (IF) rule, which gives the if type H cmd H. But this makes it illegal (under the second rule (COMPOSE)) to sequentially compose the if with the assignment y := 0, which has type L cmd 1, and H ⊆ L. To make the program well typed, we can pad the else branch to x := x + 1; skip, which has type H cmd 2. Now we can type the if using the first (IF) rule, giving it type H cmd 3, and then we can give the thread type L cmd 4, using the first rule (COMPOSE). It should be noted, however, that Agat's transformation approach is more general than what we can achieve here.
The second rule (IF) is rather complex. One might hope that we could exploit subtyping to simplify the rule, but this is not possible here. We would not want to coerce the type of e up to τ 2 , because then it would appear that the execution time of the if depends on τ 2 variables. Nor would we want to coerce the types of c 1 and c 2 to τ 1 cmd τ 3 , because then it would appear that the if can assign to τ 1 variables.
The constraint τ 3 ⊆ τ 2 in rule (WHILE) can be understood by considering that the command while e do c implicitly involves sequential composition of c and the entire loop, as shown in the second rule (LOOP). As a result, if c's running time depends on H variables, then c must not assign to L variables. For example, if x is H and y is L, then without the constraint τ 3 ⊆ τ 2 in rule (WHILE), the following program would be well typed: while 1 do (y := y + 1; while x do skip)
Note that y := y + 1 has type L cmd L and while x do skip has type H cmd H, so the loop body has type L cmd H. Hence, without the constraint τ 3 ⊆ τ 2 , the while loop could be given type L cmd H. But the loop is dangerous -if x = 0, then y is incremented only once, and if x = 0, then y is incremented repeatedly. Finally, we note that protect c takes a command that is guaranteed to terminate and makes it appear to run in just one step. This gives another way of dealing with the example program discussed above; rather than padding the else branch, we can just protect the if (or just its then branch), thereby masking any timing differences resulting from different values of x.
Properties of the type system
In this section, we formally establish the properties of the type system. We begin with two lemmas describing the expressiveness of our type system. First, we show that our type system does not restrict a thread at all unless the thread involves both L and H variables:
Lemma 5.1. Any command involving only L variables has type L cmd L. Any command involving only H variables has type H cmd H.
Note this is certainly not the case for the type system of [23] , since (for example) that system disallows H variables in the guards of while loops.
Next we show that our type system is strictly less restrictive than that of [23] . Recall that that system requires that each command c be both well typed and protected, which means that any if commands with H guards within c are wrapped with protect, so that they execute atomically. [23] , then c has type τ cmd L under our type system.
Lemma 5.2. If c has type τ cmd and is protected under the type system of

Proof. By induction on the structure of c.
Now we turn to the question of the soundness of the type system, beginning with some standard lemmas.
Lemma 5.3 (Simple Security). If Γ e : L, then e contains only L variables.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e.
Lemma 5.4 (Confinement). If Γ c : H cmd _ , then c does not assign to any L variables.
Proof. By induction on the structure of c. Now we have a slightly unusual Subject Reduction lemma, because on commands of type τ cmd n, the running time "counts down" as we execute:
Proof. By induction on the structure of c.
First, under the hypothesis that (c, µ) −→ (c , µ ), c cannot be of the form x := e, skip, or protect c .
If c is of the form if e then c 1 else c 2 , then c is either c 1 or c 2 . Now, if c has type τ cmd n, then it must be typed by the first rule (IF), which implies that both c 1 and c 2 have type τ cmd (n − 1). And if c has type τ 1 cmd τ 2 , then it is typed either with the first rule (IF) (using the fact that τ 1 cmd m ⊆ τ 1 cmd τ 2 ), or with the second rule (IF). In the first case, c 1 
If c has type τ cmd n, then it must be typed by the first rule (COMPOSE) which means that c 1 has type τ cmd k and c 2 has type τ cmd l for some k and l with k + l = n. If c is c 2 , then we must have k = 1, so c 2 has type τ cmd (n − 1). If c is c 1 ; c 2 , then by induction c 1 has type τ cmd (k − 1), and therefore c has type τ cmd (k − 1 + l) = τ cmd (n − 1). And if c has type τ 1 cmd τ 2 , then it must be typed by the second rule (COMPOSE) which means that c 1 has type τ 3 cmd τ 4 and c 2 has type τ 5 cmd τ 6 , for some τ 3 , τ 4 , τ 5 , and τ 6 satisfying the subtyping constraints τ 4 
Proof.
It is easy to see that no commands have type τ cmd 0. Hence the only commands with type τ cmd 1 are x := e, skip, and protect c 1 . The result is immediate in the first two cases. In the case of protect c 1 , note that rule (PROTECT) requires c 1 to be free of while loops; hence by Lemma 2.4 c 1 is guaranteed to terminate.
We now explore the behavior of a well-typed command c when run under two low-equivalent memories. We begin with a Mutual Termination lemma for whilefree programs: Proof. By induction on the structure of c, using Lemma 2.4.
In the context of multi-threaded programs, however, it is not enough to consider only the final memory resulting from the execution of c (as in the Mutual Termination lemma); we must also consider timing. The key property that lets us establish weak probabilistic noninterference is this: if a well-typed command c is run under two low-equivalent memories, it makes exactly the same sequence of assignments to L variables, at the same times. Hence the two memories will remain low-equivalent after every execution step. (Note however that c may terminate more slowly, or even not terminate at all, under one of the two memories. But then the slower execution will not make any more assignments to L variables.)
Here's an example that illustrates some of the working of the type system. Suppose that c is a well-typed command of the form (if e then c 1 else c 2 ) ; c 3 .
What happens when c is run under two low-equivalent memories µ and ν? If e : L, then µ(e) = ν(e) by Simple Security, and hence both executions will choose the same branch. If, instead, e : H, then the two executions may choose different branches. But if the if is typed using the first rule (IF), then both branches have type H cmd n for some n. Therefore neither branch assigns to L variables, by Confinement, and both branches terminate after n steps, by Subject Reduction. Hence both executions will reach c 3 at the same time, and the memories will still be low-equivalent. And if the if is typed using the second rule (IF), then it gets type H cmd H, which is also the type given to each branch. Again, neither branch assigns to L variables, by Confinement. Now, in this case the two branches may not terminate at the same time -indeed, one may terminate and the other may not. But the entire command (if e then c 1 else c 2 ); c 3 will have to be typed by the second rule (COMPOSE), which means that c 3 : H cmd H. Hence c 3 makes no assignments to L variables, which means that, as far as L variables are concerned, it doesn't matter when (or even whether) c 3 is executed.
To formalize these ideas, we need to define a notion of low-equivalence on configurations; then we can argue that −→ takes low-equivalent configurations to lowequivalent configurations. But first we make some observations about sequential composition. Any command c can be written in the standard form (In effect, we are saying that a command of type H cmd _ is low-equivalent to a terminated command.) Now we are ready to show the key Sequential Noninterference result: We remark here that if c is well typed and µ ∼ Γ ν, then (c, µ) ∼ Γ (c, ν). Hence, by applying the Sequential Noninterference Theorem repeatedly, we see that, for all k, the configuration reached from (c, µ) after k steps will be low-equivalent to the configuration reached from (c, ν) after k steps. Hence, as we claimed above, the two executions make exactly the same assignments to L variables, at the same times. Now we are ready to change our focus from the execution of an individual thread c, which is deterministic, to the execution of a pool of threads O, which is a Markov chain. In the next section, we prove the soundness of our type system by showing that every well-typed thread pool O satisfies weak probabilistic noninterference, as defined in Section 3.
Well-typed thread pools satisfy weak probabilistic noninterference
Suppose that O is a well-typed thread pool. To show that O satisfies weak probabilistic noninterference, as defined in Definition 3.3, we must show that for all lowequivalent memories µ and ν, (O, µ) and (O, ν) are weak probabilistic low bisimilar. To do this, we first construct a suitable weak probabilistic low bisimulation, which we again call ∼ Γ .
Recall that we have already defined ∼ Γ on well-typed commands in Definition 5.1. We use that definition in extending ∼ Γ to well-typed global configurations; the basic idea is that ( In addition, under Definition 3.2, ∼ Γ must also be defined on global configurations that are not well typed. We deal with this by simply letting ∼ Γ be the identity relation on such configurations. (In contrast, Sabelfeld and Sands [19] address this issue by instead using partial probabilistic low bisimulations.)
and O 2 are well typed and
Now we must argue that ∼ Γ is a weak probabilistic low bisimulation, as defined in Definition 3.2. It is immediate from our definition that (O 1 , µ) ∼ Γ (O 2 , ν) implies that µ ∼ Γ ν, so the only challenge is to show that ∼ Γ is a weak probabilistic bisimulation, as defined in Definition 3. This global configuration contains two essential threads (β and γ) and one unessential thread (α). Note that β takes us to the equivalence class of
and γ takes us to the equivalence class of
We also need the following lemma:
Lemma 6.1. Every unessential thread has type H cmd _. But it is easy to see that option 1 is impossible under the rules in Fig. 2 . Also, option 3 is impossible, since we know from Subject Reduction that c 1 will actually have type H cmd (n − 1).
Proof. Suppose that (O, µ) contains an unessential thread
α = c. If (c, µ) −→ µ , then executing α takes (O, µ) to (O − α, µ ). Under Definition 6.1, (O, µ) ∼ Γ (O − α, µ ) only if c : H cmd _. If, instead, (c, µ) −→ (c , µ ), then executing α takes (O, µ) to (O[α := c ], µ ). Now (O, µ) ∼ Γ (O[α := c ], µ ) only if c ∼ Γ c
Theorem 6.2.
Relation ∼ Γ is a weak probabilistic low bisimulation on the space of global configurations.
Proof. As discussed above, it is immediate that
So it remains only to show that if A and B are distinct equivalence classes of ∼ Γ , then P(a, A, B) is independent of the choice of a. Consider any state a in A; of course a is actually a global configuration (O, µ). Note that if O is not well typed, then A is a singleton, which gives the result trivially. So we are left with the case where A contains only well-typed global configurations.
Suppose that A contains (O, µ) and that O contains an essential thread α that takes us to some equivalence class C other than A. Then thread α cannot have type H cmd _, since otherwise running α would keep us in class A. Therefore (by Definition 6.1) every global configuration in A must contain an equivalent thread α which (by the Sequential Noninterference Theorem) must also take us to equivalence class C. The conclusion is that every global configuration in A must contain the same number e of essential threads that take us out of class A, and also the same number e C of threads that take us to equivalence class C.
In addition, each global configuration a ∈ A contains some number u a of unessential threads whose execution leaves us within class A. By the lemma above, such threads have type H cmd _. Different global configurations in A can have different numbers of unessential threads, but note that if global configuration a ∈ A is reachable from a, then u a u a , since new threads cannot be created during program execution.
We are now ready to calculate P(a, A, B) and to show that its value is independent of a. To begin with, note that if e = 0, then P(a, A, B) = 0, since there is no possibility of leaving class A. Next suppose that e > 0. Then we claim that P(a, A, B) is independent of u a , and in fact P(a, A, B) = e B /e.
To justify this, first note that if we start from a, then the probability of leaving A in one step is e/(e + u a ). So, remembering that u a u a for any a reachable from a, we see that the probability of not leaving A after k steps is at most (u a /(e + u a )) k , which goes to 0 as k → ∞. Hence with probability 1, A is eventually left. (Indeed, using standard facts about geometric random variables, the expected number of steps is at most (e + u a )/e.) Hence, if we let C denote the set of all equivalence classes of ∼ Γ , we have
Now, by Theorem 3.1, the values of P(a, A, B) are the minimal non-negative solution to the equation system   P(a, A, B 
As an illustration of the timing differences allowed by weak probabilistic low bisimulation, consider again the example program of Fig. 1 Fig. 9 . Nevertheless, the final result is the same -after 13 steps, the configuration is either ({ }, [
, each with probability 1/2.
Dynamic thread creation
Our language can be safely extended with a fork command for generating new threads dynamically. Here we informally sketch an argument justifying this claim.
Let us introduce a new command, fork(c 1 , . . . , c n ), which terminates in one step, generating fresh names α 1 , . . . , α n and adding new threads α 1 = c 1 , . . . , α n = c n to the thread pool.
We claim that we can safely type fork with the following typing rule: Now, the key condition that allows us to prove that ∼ Γ is a weak probabilistic low bisimulation is equation (14) , which says that, provided that it is possible to leave equivalence class A, the probability of leaving A eventually is 1. With fork in the language, we no longer have the property used in the proof of Theorem 6.2 that if global configuration a ∈ A is reachable from a, then u a u a . The reason is that the unessential threads of a could use fork to create more unessential threads. The question arises whether these additional threads could make the probability of leaving A eventually be less than 1.
But we can note that unessential threads cannot be generated too quickly. In particular, let n be the largest number of commands forked by any of the threads in global configuration a 0 . Then if execution starts at a 0 and passes successively through global configurations a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , . . . , all in class A, then we can see that u a 1 u a 0 + n, u a 2 u a 1 + n, and so forth. If we let i denote the probability of leaving class A at step i, i 0, we see that i e e + u a 0 + in Now the probability of never leaving A is given by the infinite product The point is that the probabilities of leaving A do not decrease quickly enough to give a nonzero probability of staying in A forever; this is the case so long as we can only fork a fixed number of threads in any computation step.
Related work
As can be seen from the excellent survey by Sabelfeld and Myers [18] , the secure information flow problem has been heavily studied on a range of languages from simple imperative languages [24] to object-oriented languages [6] to the π-calculus [13] . We briefly discuss those works most closely related to this.
Myers's Jif language [16] considers a large and complex subset of Java, including exceptions but not threads. Interestingly, his rule for sequential composition is somewhat similar to ours, in that his rule prevents an assignment to a L variable from sequentially following a command that might raise an exception depending on the value of a H variable. However, Jif's type system has not been proved to guarantee a noninterference property.
As mentioned in Section 4, Boudol and Castellani [7] independently developed a type system almost identical to ours. Their soundness proof, however, stays within a possibilistic setting, avoiding consideration of probabilities.
Honda and Yoshida [13] develop a linear/affine typed pi-calculus and show how to embed several languages for secure information flow into their pi-calculus. In particular they show an embedding of the multi-threaded language considered here, and they extend it with general references and higher-order procedures. However, because their pi-calculus has a purely nondeterministic semantics, they address only possibilistic noninterference properties.
Zdancewic and Myers [26] have proposed a very different approach to achieving secure information flow in a multi-threading language. Their approach is based on forbidding observable nondeterminism like that exhibited by the example program in Fig. 1 . It would be interesting to compare the restrictiveness in practice of their system with ours; in general the practicality of secure information flow analysis has yet to be convincingly demonstrated.
Conclusion
The type system proposed here improves on that of [23] by admitting a much larger class of programs than previously permitted. In particular, there seems to be hope that the restrictions might not be too hard to accommodate in practice, since any threads that involve only H variables or only L variables are automatically well typed.
On the other hand, the soundness of our type system relies crucially on the finegrained, probabilistic scheduler specified in Fig. 3 . As mentioned at the end of Section 2, this scheduler is of course very far from typical practical implementations like round-robin time slicing, suggesting that our results are mainly of theoretical interest. While this is a valid concern, it is also important to recognize that something like round-robin time slicing gives rise to very subtle timing leaks that would be very hard to prevent with typing rules. Consider the following example, adapted from Agat [2] . Suppose that secret is either 0 or 1. At an abstract level, the amount of work done by this program does not seem to depend on the value of secret. But, when run on a local Sparc server with a 16K data cache, it takes twice as long when secret is 0 as it takes when secret is 1. (When secret is 1, the array xs can remain in the data cache throughout the program's execution; when secret is 0, the data cache holds xs and ys alternately.) As a result, if this program were run concurrently with another thread leak = 1; then, under round-robin time slicing, we are likely to end up copying secret into leak. It is arguable, then, that if we really want to prevent information leaks in multi-threaded programs, the best approach may be to adopt the probabilistic scheduling used here, in spite of its inefficiency.
In future work on our type system, it would be interesting to explore algorithms for type checking or type inference, and to extend the language with additional features, such as synchronization primitives.
